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Tommy Andersson
Tommy Andersson
Department of Economics, Lund University
Zweryfikowany adres z nek.lu.se
Tytuł
Cytowane przez
Cytowane przez
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Building kidney exchange programmes in Europe—an overview of exchange practice and activities
P Biró, B Haase-Kromwijk, T Andersson, EI Ásgeirsson, T Baltesová, ...
Transplantation 103 (7), 1514-1522, 2019
1262019
Modelling and optimisation in European kidney exchange programmes
P Biró, J Van de Klundert, D Manlove, W Pettersson, T Andersson, ...
European Journal of Operational Research 291 (2), 447-456, 2021
902021
Placement optimization in refugee resettlement
N Ahani, T Andersson, A Martinello, A Teytelboym, AC Trapp
Operations Research 69 (5), 1468-1486, 2021
88*2021
School Choice
A Abdulkadiroglu, T Andersson
Handbook of the Economics of Education 5, Chapter 3, 2023
80*2023
Assigning refugees to landlords in Sweden: Efficient, stable, and maximum matchings
T Andersson, L Ehlers
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 122 (3), 937-965, 2020
72*2020
Non-Manipulable House Allocation with Rent Control
T Andersson, LG Svensson
Econometrica 82 (2), 507-539, 2014
522014
Multi-Item Vickery-English-Dutch Auctions
T Andersson, A Erlanson
Games and Economic Behavior 81, 116-129, 2012
472012
Budget balance, fairness, and minimal manipulability
T Andersson, L Ehlers, LG Svensson
Theoretical Economics 9 (3), 753-777, 2014
462014
Pairwise kidney exchange over the blood group barrier
T Andersson, J Kratz
The Review of Economic Studies 87 (3), 1091-1133, 2020
45*2020
Dynamic refugee matching
T Andersson, L Ehlers, A Martinello
Working Paper, 2018
362018
Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders
T Andersson, C Andersson, AJJ Talman
Annals of Operations Research 211 (1), 27-36, 2013
342013
Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited
T Andersson, LG Svensson
Mathematical Social Sciences 56 (3), 350-354, 2008
292008
Refugee matching as a market design application
T Andersson
The Future of Economic Design: The Continuing Development of a Field as …, 2019
262019
Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
T Andersson, L Ehlers, LG Svensson
Mathematical Social Sciences 69, 43-49, 2014
242014
Organizing time exchanges: Lessons from matching markets
T Andersson, Á Cseh, L Ehlers, A Erlanson
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13 (1), 338-373, 2021
232021
Sequential school choice with public and private schools
T Andersson, U Dur, S Ertemel, O Kesten
Working paper, 2018
222018
A Competitive Partnership Formation Process
T Andersson, J Gudmundsson, D Talman, Z Yang
Games and Economic Behavior 86 (1), 165-177, 2013
192013
Profit maximizing nonlinear pricing
T Andersson
Economics Letters 88 (1), 135-139, 2005
192005
Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: A market design approach
T Andersson, L Ehlers, LG Svensson
Journal of Economic Theory 165, 643-671, 2016
152016
Kidney exchange practices in Europe
P Biró, L Burnapp, B Haase, A Hemke, R Johnson, J van de Klundert, ...
First Handbook of the COST Action CA15210: European Network for …, 2017
142017
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