| Blockchain mining games A Kiayias, E Koutsoupias, M Kyropoulou, Y Tselekounis Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 365-382, 2016 | 228 | 2016 |
| The efficiency of fair division I Caragiannis, C Kaklamanis, P Kanellopoulos, M Kyropoulou Theory of Computing Systems 50 (4), 589-610, 2012 | 112 | 2012 |
| On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions I Caragiannis, C Kaklamanis, P Kanellopoulos, M Kyropoulou Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 81-90, 2011 | 88 | 2011 |
| Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions I Caragiannis, C Kaklamanis, P Kanellopoulos, M Kyropoulou, B Lucier, ... Journal of Economic Theory 156, 343-388, 2015 | 85 | 2015 |
| The efficiency of fair division I Caragiannis, C Kaklamanis, P Kanellopoulos, M Kyropoulou International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, 475-482, 2009 | 50 | 2009 |
| The impact of altruism on the efficiency of atomic congestion games I Caragiannis, C Kaklamanis, P Kanellopoulos, M Kyropoulou, ... International Symposium on Trustworthy Global Computing, 172-188, 2010 | 44 | 2010 |
| Almost envy-freeness in group resource allocation M Kyropoulou, W Suksompong, AA Voudouris Theoretical Computer Science 841, 110-123, 2020 | 36 | 2020 |
| An improved approximation bound for spanning star forest and color saving S Athanassopoulos, I Caragiannis, C Kaklamanis, M Kyropoulou International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science, 90-101, 2009 | 25 | 2009 |
| On low-envy truthful allocations I Caragiannis, C Kaklamanis, P Kanellopoulos, M Kyropoulou International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, 111-119, 2009 | 23 | 2009 |
| The VCG mechanism for Bayesian scheduling Y Giannakopoulos, M Kyropoulou ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 5 (4), 1-16, 2017 | 18 | 2017 |
| Obviously strategyproof mechanisms without money for scheduling M Kyropoulou, C Ventre Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and …, 2019 | 13 | 2019 |
| Mechanism design for constrained heterogeneous facility location M Kyropoulou, C Ventre, X Zhang International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 63-76, 2019 | 11 | 2019 |
| The anarchy of scheduling without money Y Giannakopoulos, E Koutsoupias, M Kyropoulou Theoretical Computer Science 778, 19-32, 2019 | 11 | 2019 |
| Revenue guarantees in the generalized second price auction I Caragiannis, C Kaklamanis, P Kanellopoulos, M Kyropoulou ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT) 14 (2-3), 17, 2014 | 10* | 2014 |
| Modified schelling games P Kanellopoulos, M Kyropoulou, AA Voudouris International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, 241-256, 2020 | 9 | 2020 |
| Fair cake-cutting in practice M Kyropoulou, J Ortega, E Segal-Halevi Games and Economic Behavior 133, 28-49, 2022 | 6 | 2022 |
| Limitations of deterministic auction design for correlated bidders I Caragiannis, C Kaklamanis, M Kyropoulou ACM Transactions on Computation Theory (TOCT) 8 (4), 1-18, 2016 | 6 | 2016 |
| Not all strangers are the same: The impact of tolerance in schelling games P Kanellopoulos, M Kyropoulou, AA Voudouris arXiv preprint arXiv:2105.02699, 2021 | 5 | 2021 |
| Obviously strategyproof single-minded combinatorial auctions B De Keijzer, M Kyropoulou, C Ventre Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs) 168, 71, 2020 | 5 | 2020 |
| Modified schelling games P Kanellopoulos, M Kyropoulou, AA Voudouris Theoretical Computer Science 880, 1-19, 2021 | 3 | 2021 |
Ioannis CaragiannisProfessor, Aarhus UniversityZweryfikowany adres z cs.au.dk
