Obserwuj
S. Matthew Weinberg
S. Matthew Weinberg
Assistant Professor, Princeton University
Zweryfikowany adres z princeton.edu - Strona główna
Tytuł
Cytowane przez
Cytowane przez
Rok
On the instability of bitcoin without the block reward
M Carlsten, H Kalodner, SM Weinberg, A Narayanan
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications …, 2016
3232016
Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design
R Kleinberg, SM Weinberg
Games and Economic Behavior 113, 97-115, 2019
250*2019
A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer
M Babaioff, N Immorlica, B Lucier, SM Weinberg
Journal of the ACM (JACM) 67 (4), 1-40, 2020
2112020
Optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design: Reducing revenue to welfare maximization
Y Cai, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg
2012 IEEE 53rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 130-139, 2012
2032012
Arbitrum: Scalable, private smart contracts
H Kalodner, S Goldfeder, X Chen, SM Weinberg, EW Felten
27th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 18), 1353-1370, 2018
1762018
An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms
Y Cai, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing …, 2012
1742012
Pricing lotteries
P Briest, S Chawla, R Kleinberg, SM Weinberg
Journal of Economic Theory 156, 144-174, 2015
141*2015
A duality based unified approach to bayesian mechanism design
Y Cai, NR Devanur, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the forty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing …, 2016
1212016
Simple mechanisms for a subadditive buyer and applications to revenue monotonicity
A Rubinstein, SM Weinberg
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 6 (3-4), 1-25, 2018
1132018
Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information
PD Azar, R Kleinberg, SM Weinberg
Games and Economic Behavior 118, 511-532, 2019
103*2019
Understanding incentives: Mechanism design becomes algorithm design
Y Cai, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg
2013 IEEE 54th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 618-627, 2013
992013
Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design
C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 370-387, 2012
93*2012
Bitcoin: A natural oligopoly
N Arnosti, SM Weinberg
Management Science, 2022
762022
Reducing revenue to welfare maximization: Approximation algorithms and other generalizations
Y Cai, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete …, 2013
722013
Formal barriers to longest-chain proof-of-stake protocols
J Brown-Cohen, A Narayanan, A Psomas, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 459-473, 2019
672019
Optimal and efficient parametric auctions
P Azar, S Micali, C Daskalakis, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete …, 2013
642013
Parallel algorithms for select and partition with noisy comparisons
M Braverman, J Mao, SM Weinberg
Proceedings of the forty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing …, 2016
542016
The sample complexity of up-to-ε multi-dimensional revenue maximization
YA Gonczarowski, SM Weinberg
Journal of the ACM (JACM) 68 (3), 1-28, 2021
462021
Computing exact minimum cuts without knowing the graph
A Rubinstein, T Schramm, SM Weinberg
arXiv preprint arXiv:1711.03165, 2017
362017
Selling to a no-regret buyer
M Braverman, J Mao, J Schneider, M Weinberg
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 523-538, 2018
332018
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